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Abstract 
Oil prices have fluctuated considerably in the last few years, with major effects on the 
economy. This paper describes some of the mechanisms by which these fluctuations 
produce changes in the long-run growth of the economy. In particular, it analyses the effect 
on productivity, capital stock and structural unemployment. The analysis suggests that a 
(permanent) increase in oil prices can significantly reduce potential output. From an 
economic policy point of view, this effect may be more marked when competition in the 
product markets is low or when wage indexation is high; thus, reforms aiming to increase 
competition and improve wage-setting mechanisms help to reduce the negative effects of 
higher oil prices on long-run economic growth. 
Keywords: oil price, potential output, production function. 
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CONTENTS 
Abstract   7 
CONTENTS   9 
1 Introduction   11 
2 The effect of oil prices on the determinants of potential output   12 
2.1 Productivity   13 
2.2 Capital stock   15 
2.3 Employment   16 
2.3.1 LABOUR DEMAND   17 
2.3.2 LABOUR SUPPLY   18 
2.3.3 LABOUR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM: THE NAIRU   18 
3 Empirical evidence on the importance of these channels   20 
4 Conclusions   25 
REFERENCES   26 
 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0902 
1 Introduction 
Although oil prices in the international markets have diminished significantly in recent months 
to $40 per barrel, since the beginning of the new millennium they have followed an upward 
trend, amply exceeding the $100 per barrel barrier by mid-2008. Thus, the price of oil in real 
terms (that is, calculated in the currency of the country in question and subtracting the price 
level) surpassed the historical peaks reached in the first half of the 1980s in most importing 
countries. This behaviour can be expected to have had a significant impact on both 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply of the economy. 
The channels that transform an increase in oil prices into a higher level of inflation 
and a reduction in the real demand of agents are well understood. By contrast, less is known 
of how this kind of shock impacts supply in the economy. This document seeks to describe 
some of the mechanisms affecting the aggregate supply of an oil importing country after a 
(permanent) change in the price of this raw material. 
Before starting, it is important to clarify that the concept of aggregate supply we are 
going to use is the traditional definition of potential output, that is, the level of activity 
that can feasibly be reached without generating inflationary pressures. Furthermore, some 
simplifying assumptions are made. First, we do not delve into the reasons behind changes 
in oil prices. However, in the real world, the behaviour of the oil price, like that of any other 
product, can be the result of shocks to supply or demand (or both), and the impact on the 
economy can be very different depending on the initial cause of the price adjustment.1 
Second, the definition of oil price that is relevant for economic agents has to take into account 
the exchange rate2 and oil-related indirect taxes.3 This paper does not consider the impact of 
taxes and, although our analysis considers exchange rate, it does not take into account 
the effect of currency appreciation or depreciation on competitiveness, and, therefore, on 
potential output.4 
Against this background, the paper describes three possible channels by which 
oil prices may influence the level of potential output (measured in terms of gross domestic 
product GDP). Thus the next section analyses, firstly, the effect on (estimated) 
productivity, secondly, the (optimal) capital stock, and, finally, the level of potential 
employment. The third section provides some simple empirical evidence on the prevalence of 
these channels in Europe and their quantitative impact. The last section sets out the main 
conclusions. 
                                                                          
1. For example, if the increase in oil prices is the result of strong oil demand by particular importing countries, these 
countries will demand not only oil but also other goods and services produced by other importing oil countries, which will 
also benefit from the increase in global demand. However, if the increase in oil prices is a result of lower oil supply 
(due, for example, to a strengthening of the OPEC’s oligopolistic power or to a reassessment of oil reserves), all the oil 
importing countries will reduce their aggregate demand for goods and services, including imports; thus world trade 
will diminish and therefore the exports of oil importing countries will fall. When the increase in oil prices is due to 
speculative financial factors, the implications are more complicated. 
2. This means that the oil price has to be measured in the currency of the importing country. 
3. It is necessary to consider indirect taxes because most of them are specific (as opposed to ad-valorem taxes, 
like VAT). Thus they do not change when oil prices change and they therefore soften the impact of the shock in terms of 
the price borne by the final consumer. 
4. It is interesting to highlight this last relationship, since sometimes it is argued that an increase in the dollar price of oil is 
less harmful if it happens at the same time as an appreciation of the currency of the oil importing country with 
respect to the dollar. However, this analysis does not consider that the appreciation worsens competitiveness 
of the country and therefore, its domestic production is more expensive and the foreign production cheaper, thus 
reducing GDP. 
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2 The effect of oil prices on the determinants of potential output 
As said in the introduction, in order to analyse the effect of oil prices on the aggregate supply 
of the economy, this latter concept is taken as synonymous with potential output. Following 
tradition, potential output is defined as the level of production that can be reached by the 
economy using the available productive factors and existing technology without generating 
inflationary pressures. Therefore, potential output can be considered a good description of 
the supply side of the economy and thus a key variable for economic analysis and the design 
of economic policy. 
From a theoretical perspective, potential output can be modelled by means of a 
production function relating the (real) GDP of the economy (Y) to the inputs used to 
generate it. Usually, two primary inputs are considered (capital K and labour L) and a 
third variable is included to capture the part of observed production that is not explained 
by the recorded utilisation levels of the primary inputs. This last “factor” is known as total 
factor productivity (TFP, denoted by the letter “A”). It proxies the technical efficiency with 
which the productive factors are used and its behaviour is related to technological progress. 
Mathematically, the productive process can be expressed as follows: 
 L,KFAY   [1] 
where F is a (production) function which is twice differentiable and homogeneous of 
degree 1. This last condition implies that the productive process exhibits constant returns 
to scale; meaning that if the primary input endowments increase in the same proportion, 
production also increases by that proportion. As a result, applying the Euler theorem to 
this expression gives: 
 
al
Y
LFk
Y
KFy LK    [2] 
 
where the lower-case letters represent the natural log of the corresponding upper-case 
variables,  is the difference operator and FI represents the partial derivative of the production 
function with respect to each primary input (that is, its marginal productivity). Assuming the 
existence of perfect competition in the input and product markets, profit optimisation 
first-order conditions imply that the marginal productivity of labour and capital will be equal to 
the real wage (W/P) and the real user cost of capital (CU/P), respectively. Therefore, [2] can 
be written as follows: 
  alsksy LL   1  [3] 
where sL is the share of labour income in nominal production. 
In this last expression, all the variables are observable apart from the TFP growth 
rate; therefore, it can be obtained as a residual. This means that, by construction, the 
production function will be exactly fulfilled. 
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However, in order to estimate the potential output of the economy it will be 
necessary to evaluate this equation at the potential level of each productive factor. Thus, 
starting with TFP, its potential level is usually proxied by filtering this residual input with 
a statistical procedure to eliminate its fluctuations at the business cycle frequency ( a ). 
In the case of the capital stock, its potential level is traditionally equated to its observed 
value because, as it is the accumulation of an investment flow (with a depreciation rate which 
is not very large), it does not exhibit fluctuations at the business cycle frequency. Finally, 
the increase in potential employment ( l ) is estimated by adding the growth rate of the 
(working-age) population (which should be filtered since, although the natural growth of 
population is not correlated with the cycle, migrant flows are), the potential participation 
rate (that is, the proportion of the working age population that is working or actively seeking 
a job  pop ) and, with a negative sign, the changes in the potential unemployment rate 
(proportion of participants in the labour market that do not find a job). This last variable is 
called the NAIRU and is defined as the level of the unemployment rate that does not generate 
inflationary pressures. Leaving aside socio-demographic elements, like the incorporation of 
women in the labour market, the potential participation rate should have a close negative 
relationship with the NAIRU, since individuals will be more reluctant to participate in that 
market when conditions are less favourable, that is, when the unemployment rate is higher. 
Thus, to estimate the potential growth of the economy ( y ) it suffices to replace the 
observed values in expression [3] by their potential counterparts: 
   	 
 aNAIRUpopsksy LL   11  [4] 
At both theoretical and empirical level, at least three channels have been identified 
through which oil prices influence potential growth: potential TFP, the capital stock and the 
NAIRU. The next three sections describe them. 
2.1 Productivity 
The first channel is the possible impact of oil prices on (measured) productivity. The difference 
between gross production and the value added of the economy serves to illustrate 
this mechanism. GDP can be obtained as the sum of the value added by firms and, 
in the National Accounts framework, it is estimated by subtracting intermediate consumption 
from gross production. Intermediate consumption includes imported crude oil and derivatives. 
Therefore, an increase in oil prices may mean that, even with the same capital and labour 
endowment, the share of production that remains in the oil importing country is lower. Higher 
oil prices are thus equivalent to a decrease in the productivity of the two primary inputs. 
Therefore, a similarity exists between an oil price shock and a TFP shock. 
Algebraically (and assuming for the sake of simplicity that the only intermediate 
consumption is imported oil), the value added in nominal terms (PY) will be equal to nominal 
gross production (PQQ) minus imports of oil, also in nominal terms (POO): 
OPQPYP OQ   [5] 
In real terms (that is, taking on board price changes), the estimation of GDP is slightly 
more complicated, as its deflator is not an observable variable. Thus, the National Accounts 
use a technique known as “double deflation”. This methodology consists, firstly, of obtaining 
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the growth of gross production and oil imports in real terms; this is an easy task, since these 
prices are observable. Secondly, the real growth of oil imports, weighted by the share of 
this intermediate consumption in gross production (sQO), is subtracted from real gross 
production growth: 
Q
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

1

  [6] 
Using this definition, it can be shown that the value added deflator can be calculated 
as follows: 
Q
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
1

  [7] 
that is, it deducts oil prices from gross production prices. 
From an economic perspective, modelling gross production is conceptually 
equivalent to GDP, except for the appearance of a new productive factor, namely oil 
(or intermediate consumption in more general frameworks). Therefore, using the same 
symbols, we can write: 
 O,L,KFAQ QQ  [8] 
Notice that neither gross production TFP nor the production function need be 
the same as the value added (GDP) function. In any case, imposing the same conditions 
as in the case of GDP (constant return to scale in the three inputs and perfect competition in 
factor and product markets), a very similar expression is obtained. Thus, the gross production 
growth rate is a weighted average of the productive factor growth rates (the weights being the 
share of each factor’s cost in nominal gross production sQI) plus TFP growth rate: 
 
QQ
O
Q
L
Q
O
Q
L aoslskssq   1  [9] 
Thus, if expression [6] is substituted in [9], the following production function for GDP 
growth is obtained: 
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                                                              [10] 
If this last equation is compared with that obtained in [3], it may be concluded that oil 
(and, therefore, its price) does not play any role in the determination of real GDP. However, it 
should be taken into account that the TFP growth rate in terms of GDP is equal to the TFP 
growth rate in terms of gross production divided by one minus the weight of oil costs in gross 
production, and this weight can change when oil prices change. 
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In particular, if, following an increase in real oil prices the relative demand for oil 
declines more than proportionally (that is, if the elasticity of substitution between oil and 
the other intermediate inputs is higher than one), the weight of the cost of oil in nominal 
gross production will diminish, thereby reducing TFP expressed in terms of GDP for a 
given gross production TFP. Conversely, if, following an increase in real oil prices the 
relative demand for oil declines less than proportionally (that is, if the elasticity of substitution 
between oil and the other intermediate inputs is lower than one), the weight of the cost of oil 
will rise, thereby increasing TFP in terms of GDP for a given gross production TFP. 
2.2  Capital stock 
The second productive factor that can be affected by changes in the relative price of oil is the 
capital stock of the economy. In the short term, an increase in the price of this raw material 
may push some production plants and equipment into obsolescence as they become 
unprofitable. This loss of profitability may arise because another less oil-intensive technology 
becomes available and/or because the products manufactured by them are oil intensive and 
demand thus declines. 
However, to affect the potential output of the economy, oil prices have to have an 
impact on the long-term (equilibrium) capital stock. In this respect, Finn (2000) showed 
theoretically how, under certain conditions, a permanent increase in oil prices lowers the 
equilibrium level of the capital stock in the long term. The intuition for this outcome is 
that if energy is an essential complement of equipment goods needed to generate production 
services, the user cost of capital should include the price of oil and, therefore, be positively 
correlated with it. As a result, the optimal degree of utilisation of the capital stock will diminish, 
and, if the depreciation rate depends on the degree of utilisation, it will also decline. Therefore, 
for a given level of production, the investment and the capital stock should be lower. 
Formally, the two assumptions that Finn (2000) relaxes to obtain these results are as 
follows. The first is that energy is an essential complement needed for the capital stock 
to be able to generate production services. Thus, capital utilisation (U) can only be increased 
if the amount of energy per unit of capital is also increased: 
 kou 

 
1  [11] 
The second is that the depreciation rate of capital () is variable, being positively 
correlated with the degree of capital utilisation: 
u   [12] 
If these two conditions are introduced in a standard profit optimisation problem of a 
representative firm where value added behaves according to a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, the arguments of which are employment and the level of capital stock used 
(that is, the product of capital stock and the degree of utilisation), it can be shown that the 
ratio of capital stock to GDP will depend negatively on a redefined user cost of capital. 
The redefinition consists of adding the real price of energy to the traditional user cost of 
capital (that is, the product of the relative price of investment goods and the real interest 
rate plus the depreciation rate). This additional term is due, on the one hand, to the 
dependence of the depreciation rate on the level of capital utilisation, and, through it, 
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on energy intensity. Thus, an increase in the real price of energy will diminish energy intensity 
and capital utilisation and, therefore, lower depreciation; this means that the user cost of 
capital will decline, increasing the optimal capital stock for a given GDP. On the other hand, in 
order to obtain productive services from capital, it is strictly necessary to consume energy. 
Therefore the real price of energy will appear directly in the user cost of capital. In this case, 
an increase in the real price of energy will raise the user cost of capital, inducing a downward 
adjustment in the desired capital stock for any level of production. Finn (2000) shows that this 
second channel dominates the aggregate results, so there will be a negative relationship 
between a firm’s optimal level of capital and the real price of energy for any production level 
and traditional user cost of capital. 
However, these effects are difficult to isolate empirically, since, at aggregate level, 
capital stock is not directly observed. On the contrary, it is built by accumulating observed 
investment (from a given initial condition), using a specific depreciation rate. The problem 
is that, although the depreciation rate can vary over time (mainly due to changes in the 
capital stock composition), there is doubt as to whether it captures the degree of capital 
utilisation. Besides, there are no quantitative or qualitative statistics measuring the degree 
of capital utilisation for the whole economy. This makes it more feasible to test this 
assumption using data from investment. To do so, it has to be kept in mind that in 
the steady state, the investment-capital stock ratio should be equal to the depreciation rate 
(that is, in the steady state, investment only occurs to replace depreciated capital and 
maintain the level of production). This implies that if the capital stock depends negatively 
on the real price of oil for a given level of production and the traditional user cost of capital, 
this negative relationship will be even stronger in the case of investment, because when the 
real price of oil increases, depreciation declines and, therefore, less investment is necessary 
to replace the depreciated capital: 
       ppcuyiLnki O    [13] 
2.3 Employment 
The third way in which oil prices can influence potential output is through potential 
employment. Here it should be considered that, as pointed out above, potential employment 
is usually estimated by applying an equilibrium unemployment rate (or NAIRU) to a measure of 
the population participating in the labour market. In particular, the first step in determining 
potential employment is to establish what part of the working-age population is potentially 
willing to participate actively in the labour market. From this group it would then be 
necessary to subtract those individuals who, as a result of labour market rigidities, could 
only be employed assuming a higher level of inflation. This result is then expressed as 
a percentage of the active population to give what is known as the NAIRU. Therefore, 
the NAIRU is the variable that balances the labour market.5 Consequently, to test if the real oil 
price has an impact on the NAIRU, it is necessary to know if it shifts and if so, in what 
direction the labour demand and/or supply curves. 
It has also been proposed that the part of the working-age population actively 
participating in the labour market may depend on the equilibrium unemployment rate. This is 
known as the discouragement effect. This effect is explained as follows: the unemployment 
                                                                          
5. The intuition is that if the share of labour income demanded by workers is much higher than that which firms are able 
to pay, there will be a disequilibrium which will be adjusted through an increase in the unemployment rate. 
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rate of an economy can be understood as a rough approximation to the inverse of the 
probability of finding a job; thus, if it is permanently high there will be individuals who, although 
of working age, do not search for a job because ex-ante the probability of finding it is 
very low. In the same vein, when the unemployment rate is lower, hiring conditions for 
workers improve, increasing the possible reward from participating in the market. 
Therefore it can generally be assumed that real oil prices can shift labour demand 
and supply, and this translates into changes in the equilibrium unemployment rate. 
2.3.1 LABOUR DEMAND 
Labour demand by firms can be estimated from the profit optimisation first-order conditions 
for this primary input. Thus, in its simpler version, employment will depend positively on the 
level of production to be reached and negatively on the real labour cost of hiring a worker, 
since higher wages imply the substitution of capital for labour. If it is assumed that, as usual, 
firms have some market power (that is, they have a certain ability to set the selling price of 
products), there appears a new determinant of labour demand: the mark-up of prices over 
marginal costs (). The effect of mark-ups on employment is a consequence of imperfect 
competition in the product market. This imperfect competition raises equilibrium prices 
above those found in perfect competition, making for a lower quantity exchanged in the 
market and produced by the firm. In particular, if, for example, mark-ups widen, the firm 
gains market power; therefore, the optimal decision of the firm is to raise selling prices and 
reduce production to increase profits; thus, for a given real labour cost, it will hire a lower 
number of workers. In this context, if mark-ups increase when real oil prices are higher, 
employment demand will be lower for every wage and, therefore, the structural 
unemployment rate (the NAIRU) will tend to increase. 
The conditions under which a relationship holds between mark-ups and oil prices 
are relatively easy to derive. For example, assuming that the gross production function of a 
representative firm (with market power) is of the Cobb-Douglas type with constant returns to 
scale in the two primary inputs (capital and employment) and in intermediate consumption, 
the profit maximisation first-order condition for employment implies: 
   
QpwqLnl    [14] 
Substituting in this expression real gross production and its deflator defined in [6] 
and [7], it is easy to check that, for a given GDP and real wage (defined in terms of the 
GDP deflator), employment will be higher when oil costs account for a higher share of 
nominal gross production (implying a lower mark-up of value-added prices on value-added 
marginal costs): 
     pwysLnsLnl QO
Q
O    [15] 
Thus, as with TFP in terms of value added, if following an increase in the real oil 
price there is a more than proportional reduction in the relative demand for oil (that is, if the 
substitution elasticity between oil and the other two primary inputs is higher than one), 
the weight of this input in total costs will diminish (and this is equivalent to an increase in 
mark-ups in terms of GDP) and labour demand will decline. Conversely, if following the same 
shock the relative demand for oil declines less than proportionally (that is, if the substitution 
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elasticity between oil and the other two primary inputs is lower than one), the mark-up in 
terms of value added will diminish, and labour demand for a given level of GDP and real 
wages will increase.6 
2.3.2 LABOUR SUPPLY 
Just as labour demand encapsulates firms’ decisions, labour supply reflects the wage 
claims of workers. The wage claims of workers7 will generally increase with higher inflation 
(in terms of gross production) and productivity. Conversely, rises in the unemployment rate 
will diminish the wage pressure, because this reduces the probability of finding a job and 
raises the probability of losing it. As a result, following Layard et al. (1991), wage claims of 
workers will be represented by the following equation: 
  Ulypw Q    [16] 
where  is a variable reflecting other labour market institutions such as, among others, 
unemployment benefits, and the coordination and centralisation of collective bargaining 
that may also influence labour supply. 
Substituting in this expression the definition of production prices [7], it is found that 
the real oil price has a positive effect on the wages demanded by workers: 
   ppsUlypw OQO    [17] 
Although in this expression the transmission of oil prices to wages is equal to the 
weight of these products in the consumption basket, this is usually considered a ceiling 
and, if the trade unions have little wage bargaining power, the pass-through will be lower. 
In the Spanish case, given the widespread prevalence of indexation clauses in collective 
agreements, the transmission is almost full and, more importantly, asymmetric, because 
these clauses are only activated when inflation goes beyond the target and not when it 
falls short. Accordingly, even though an oil price fluctuation may only be temporary, an 
increase in the price of this raw material will induce a permanent rise in unemployment 
and therefore in the NAIRU. 
2.3.3 LABOUR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM: THE NAIRU 
As said above, the NAIRU is the unemployment rate compatible with stable inflation. Since, in 
order to prevent inflationary pressure, the labour market should be in equilibrium, the NAIRU 
will be the unemployment rate that solves the equation system consisting of the labour 
demand curve (expression [15]) and the labour supply curve (expression [17]). Hence, using 
both equations and disregarding the integration constant, the following expression for the 
NAIRU is obtained: 
                                                                          
6. This approximation is perhaps an excessive simplification of the problem, since theoretically, when factor cost shares 
in gross production are allowed to change, the marginal cost determining the selling price is not simply the unit labour 
cost. In fact, in this case, marginal cost should also include the real price of oil. In any event, this new element will have 
an incremental effect explained in the main text. See, for example, Estrada and López-Salido (2005). 
7. A significant factor not considered here is that the wages and prices relevant to workers are not the same as 
those relevant to producers. In fact, the relevant worker wage excludes Social Security contributions and income 
tax (these are included in the labour cost of firms), and the relevant price for workers includes indirect taxes and 
imported goods prices. To simplify the analysis, only imported oil prices will be considered. 
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    qosLnNAIRU QO  

1
 [18] 
This means that the level of the NAIRU will depend on labour market institutions and 
will increase as the production mark-up increases, that is, as the market departs from perfect 
competition. Also appearing in the expression is the weight of oil costs in gross production; 
since this ratio will depend negatively on the real price of oil, increasing oil prices will drive the 
NAIRU upwards, and even more so as the economy becomes more oil intensive. 
Therefore, it can be said that the level of the NAIRU will increase with increasing real 
oil price. On the other hand, a high NAIRU reduces the potential employment of the economy 
and, thus, potential output, and, moreover, the labour market participation of the working-age 
population is lower in countries with higher unemployment rates. As noted above, this is a 
consequence of the unemployment rate being an (inverse) indicator of job finding probability. 
Obviously, for a given working-age population, potential employment will be lower when there 
is a lower long-term participation rate. Hence oil price shocks have an additional channel 
through which to affect potential output. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0902 
3 Empirical evidence on the importance of these channels 
The presence and importance of the theoretical effects of oil prices on the potential output 
of the economy described above can be easily illustrated. Chart 1 shows Brent oil prices 
from 1970, both in US dollars and in real terms (that is, taken on board each country’s 
exchange rate and general level of prices), for some European countries. As can be seen, 
although from 2002 the oil price in US dollars has been higher than the levels reached in 
the first half of the 1980s, in real terms the 2007 level was still lower than the early 1980s 
peak and, although it was temporarily exceeded in mid-2008, oil prices fell dramatically in the 
second half of that year.8 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
70 74 78 82 86 90 94 98 02 06
 US DOLLARS (nominal)
 GERMANY (real)
 FRANCE (real)
OIL PRICE IN US DOLLARS AND REAL TERMS CHART 1
SOURCES: Reuters, The Economist, AMECO and Banco de España.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
70 74 78 82 86 90 94 98 02 06
 UK (real pounds)
 US DOLLARS (nominal)
 ITALY (real)
 SPAIN (real)
 
 
Chart 2 shows some preliminary evidence on the importance of the first and second 
channels discussed in the previous section. The top panel portrays the relationship between 
TFP growth rate in GDP terms (Y-axis) and the real oil price growth rate (X-axis); in the bottom 
panel, the GDP growth rate has been replaced by the investment rate.9,10 As can be seen, the 
correlation between TFP growth and real oil price growth is negative and statistically 
significant (t-ratio = -10.3). This result suggests that the elasticity of substitution between oil 
and primary inputs is higher than one. However, the estimated coefficient implies that 
the effect is not very high; in fact, since the average growth rate of real oil prices in this period 
is 4%, the average reduction in TFP growth would be just 0.04%. In the investment case, 
                                                                          
8. In any event, it should be noted that the oil price in real terms is not the ideal variable for analysis. The problem is that 
oil derivatives are subject to a high tax burden which influences the price paid by final consumers and, therefore, 
determines their spending decisions. The lack of complete information on these taxes for all countries prevents us from 
including them in these simple exercises, but in the countries which provide that information there is a general upward 
trend in the tax burden from the sixties. This means that, for a given oil price shock in the international markets, 
the fluctuation in the oil derivatives selling price will be smaller now than in the past. 
9. Both the TFP used here and the NAIRU (analysed below) were obtained from the AMECO database constructed 
by the European Commission. It includes 11 euro area countries (the absences are Luxembourg and Slovenia, due to 
data limitations), the UK, Sweden and Denmark for the period 1965-2007. 
10. All the variables are presented in deviations from time averages for each country. Therefore, the estimated slopes 
can be understood as the between-estimator for a panel. In any case, other determinants of the variables on the vertical 
axis are not taken into account. This means that the simple correlations estimated here could be biased if the omitted 
variables are related to real oil prices. 
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a negative and statistically significant correlation is estimated (t-ratio = -9.8), as suggested by 
the theoretical model. Further, the effect in this case is more important, since it entails an 
average reduction in the investment rate of 0.05 percentage points from 1965, i.e. nearly 2 
percentage points in 2008. 
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Chart 3 shows the simple correlation between the NAIRU and the real oil price. 
As can be seen it is positive and statistically significant (t-ratio = 9.2), suggesting it dominates 
the negative effect of oil prices on the unemployment rate. The two lower panels provide 
more information on this effect, by isolating the demand side of the market (mark-ups of 
prices over marginal costs) from the supply side (the mark-up of wages over the marginal 
rate of substitution). Thus, the middle panel plots the inverse of the real unit labour cost, 
which can be considered a good approximation to the behaviour of firms’ mark-ups. 
The correlation obtained is not significant (t-ratio = 0.3).11 By contrast, there is a positive and 
significant correlation (t-ratio = 10.1) between wage claims of workers (after productivity 
and unemployment effects are taken into account) and the real oil price (bottom panel of 
Chart 3). Therefore, it seems that the wage pressure induced by an increase in oil prices 
is relieved by the hiring of fewer workers by firms, thus raising the unemployment rate. 
                                                                          
11. Notice these results are not consistent with those obtained for TFP growth since, in line with the analytical 
derivations in the previous section, they suggest that the elasticity of substitution between oil and primary input is unity. 
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In the last few years some papers have alerted of a structural change in the size of 
the effects of oil prices on the importing countries of this raw material in recent decades. 
In particular, Blanchard and Gali (2007) show that the negative and positive impact on activity 
and inflation, respectively, of an oil price increase has substantially diminished from the 
mid-1980s. Although these authors do not consider the (measured) productivity channel 
and the optimal capital stock, when the sample used in this paper is divided in the same 
year (1984) as that considered in the above-cited paper, the correlations estimated previously 
change significantly. 
Thus, as can be seen in the left-hand panels of Chart 4, before 1984 the correlation 
between TFP growth rate and real oil price growth rate was negative and significant at 
standard levels of significance (t-ratio = -9.6) and the same was true of the investment rate 
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(t-ratio = -13.6). However, alter that year, the regression coefficient in both cases diminishes 
dramatically, losing statistical significance (t-ratio = -0.6 y 0.3, respectively). These results 
suggest that from the mid-1980s oil prices have barely affected labour productivity growth, 
neither producing a decline in TFP growth nor inducing a substitution of labour by capital. 
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In the case of the NAIRU, the results are even clearer, as can be seen in the upper 
panel of Chart 5. A positive correlation in the first period (t-ratio = 18.1) gives way to a 
negative one, albeit non-significant (t-ratio = -0.6), in the second. The lower panel of that 
chart provides more evidence on the factors behind the lack of response of the NAIRU to real 
oil prices in the second part of the sample. In the first place, mark-ups have gone from acting 
as a compensative factor of this kind of disturbance (the correlation was negative and the 
t-ratio = -5.5) to being an element that stresses the initial oil price shock (positive correlation 
and t-ratio = 1.8). Contrastingly, whereas in the first part of the sample workers did not 
accept the real income loss implicit in an increase in oil prices for an importing country 
(positive correlation and t-ratio = 15.3), they seem to have changed that behaviour from 1984 
(negative correlation and t-ratio = -1.3). It should be noted that the effect of oil prices on 
wage claims relied on the significance of oil derivatives consumption in the total household 
consumption basket, and this have declined in most of the countries considered. 
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Although this empirical analysis has severe limitations, it is consistent with the 
evidence that the impact of oil price shocks has decreased in the developed economies 
and with the role that seems to have been played in this process by the reduction in labour 
market real rigidities associated with the recent labour market reforms in most European 
countries [Blanchard and Gali (2007)]. It is also noteworthy that this raw material has lost 
importance in the productive process in most of the countries considered. In any event, 
other factors that may help to explain this are a change in the substitution elasticity between 
oil and other productive inputs, and the role played by taxes on the oil derivatives demanded 
by final consumers. 
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4 Conclusions 
Oil prices reached very high levels in the first half of 2008, declining very significantly in the 
second half of the year. The analysis of the effects of these fluctuations on the economy is 
usually limited to emphasising its negative impact on demand and its positive bearing on 
inflation. Not always taken into account, however, is the possible effect on the potential 
output of the economy. This latter effect stems from the impact of oil prices on (measured) 
productivity, capital stock and the structural unemployment rate (NAIRU) of the economy, 
and, according to certain preliminary evidence, can be significant. In the case of the NAIRU, 
this effect may be amplified when there is little competition in product markets and an 
increase in oil prices is followed by increased mark-ups, or when high wage indexation 
generates a pass-through of oil price shocks to wages. In this respect, reforms that increase 
competition in product markets and improve wage-setting mechanisms help to reduce the 
negative effects of oil price increases on the long-run growth of the economy. At least 
the asymmetric working of these mechanisms should be avoided. 
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